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Risking Market Integration
without Regulatory Integration:
The Case of NAFTA and BSE
David H. Sparling and Julie A. Caswell
Under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), there has been a dramatic
increase in the integration of markets for live cattle and beef products in Canada, Mexico,
and the United States. These markets were severely disrupted in 2003 by the confirmation of
single cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada and the United States.
The bulk of this disruption could have been avoided if the countries had developed more
closely coordinated risk management programs based on the guidance of international
standards. The BSE events illustrate that failure to address regulatory integration leaves
integrated markets vulnerable to recurring disruptions.
Globalization is changing the nature and structure of agricultural and foodmarkets, providing producers with new market opportunities and broader
sourcing options and consumers with unprecedented choice and increased value.
The result is increased integration of food production and marketing systems
across international borders. The Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement
(CUSTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) accelerated
the integration in North America by reducing barriers to the flow of goods among
Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
Increased integration also presents new risk management challenges for regula-
tors and industry managers concerning all aspects of plant health, animal health,
and food safety. We examine the case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE),
popularly referred to as mad cow disease, in the North American beef industry.
BSE is a dramatic example of a class of events, including such risks as Foot and
Mouth Disease, Avian Influenza, and bioterrorism, which can disrupt industries
and markets within NAFTA, as well as trade with non-NAFTA countries.
 David H. Sparling is an associate professor in the Department of Agricultural Eco-
nomics and Business at the University of Guelph.
 Julie A. Caswell is a professor in the Department of Resource Economics, University
of Massachusetts, Amherst.
A Framework for Market and Regulatory Integration
Market integration is a matter of degree (Robertson); it can range from re-
lying on private market incentives, to lowering trade barriers through free trade
agreements (e.g., NAFTA), to eliminating internal barriers and adopting common
policy through a new centralized government (e.g., the European Union [EU]).
We consider the interactions between market and regulatory integration using
the framework presented in figure 1. The form and extent of market integration
depend on the strength of private incentives (the lower part of the figure) and the
degree to which integration is promoted or constrained by trade agreements (the
upper part of the figure). In agricultural and food markets, market integration
also depends on national plant health, animal health, and food safety regulations.
Private Incentives, Regulatory Institutions, and Market Integration
Starting at the center of figure 1, market integration occurs as firms extend their
supply chains across national borders to capitalize on opportunities or to minimize
perceived risks. Opportunities include the ability to use competitive advantages
and market prospects to sell in new international markets, to access skills and
Figure 1. A framework for market and regulatory integration
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capabilities not available to the firm in current markets, to reduce sourcing costs,
or to source materials not available in current markets. Firms also expand their
supply chains internationally to reduce price and supply risks associated with
political instability, climate and weather differences, supplier or customer power
and reliability, and food safety and other quality attributes.
The top portion of figure 1 also shows that international trade agreements
and other regulatory institutions strongly affect the degree of market integration.
Trade agreements focus on controlling tariff and nontariff barriers to trade in order
to achieve freer market access. Tariff barriers are the familiar duties on imports and
other measures, such as quotas, whose major influence is on the price of goods.
Nontariff barriers include a huge array of other practices that may impede trade,
including regulatory measures adopted by countries to manage risks (Roberts
et al., Buzby). To control the potential use of regulations as nontariff barriers,
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) sets standards for when
nontariff barriers to trade arising from national regulation of plant and animal
health and safety, and food safety, will be considered legitimate.
Under the SPS Agreement, countries have the right to choose the appropriate
level of protection and to implement programs to achieve it in the least trade-
restrictive manner. Increasingly, governments base their regulatory decisions on
risk analysis, which involves risk assessment, management, and communication.
Because factors vary between countries, as does the evaluation of risk and the
regulatory infrastructure, national governments tend to make different decisions
about how to control risks.
The SPS Agreement influences national regulation via a second route through
its recognition of standards set by three international standards bodies (the Codex
Alimentarius Commission [Codex], the World Animal Health Organization [OIE],
and the International Plant Protection Convention [IPPC]) as reference rules.
A country whose standards conform to those of one of these bodies cannot be
challenged in a trade dispute based on the legitimacy of its standards. However,
in all cases, national level governments interpret international standards and may
establish new standards.
As shown in figure 1, the SPS Agreement and international standards influence
national regulation and interpretation. In turn, the agreement and standards, in
conjunction with what other countries are doing, determine the level of regula-
tory integration among trading partners. Increased market integration usually
rests in part on facilitating integration through cross-country regulatory compli-
ance by trading partners. This regulatory integration can be pursued in three
ways:
• Policy Coordination: gradually reducing differences in policies, frequently
based on voluntary adherence to international codes of practice.
• Equivalence Agreements: agreeing to accept the regulatory program of the
trading partner as achieving the same standard (i.e., being equivalent).
• Harmonization: adopting identical or highly integrated standards and en-
forcement mechanisms.
In practice, all three routes to regulatory rapprochement have proven rocky.
Equivalence agreements are notoriously difficult because they often involve
exhaustive reviews of each other’s frequently changing policy. Harmonization
requires agreement on regulatory goals and mechanisms that is hard to achieve
among independent countries. Countries are loath to turn over any of their risk
management and regulatory decision making to outsiders.
Frustration with the slow pace of regulatory integration motivated the EU to
consolidate significant regulatory functions in a central government structure
to achieve harmonization (Harvey). The NAFTA countries, on the other hand,
are practicing weaker forms of policy coordination or at most equivalence. This
necessarily places limits on the degree of sustainable market integration.
Market Integration and Risk
Integration implies interdependence, which affects risk. In highly integrated
systems, problems in one country can have significant impacts on the production
systems and markets of others. In the case of food safety, plant health, and animal
health, the repercussions of a risk event depend on its nature and the country
where the event occurs. Integration can increase both the probability and scale of
an event. We classify challenges to food systems into private and public risks.
The impacts of private risks, and the events associated with them, are primarily
in an individual supply chain and its customers. The impacts of hazards like E. coli
or Salmonella, although dangerous to the public, are generally limited to the food
chains directly handling and distributing the affected products. The government
response tends to be censure (prosecution), recalls, fines, increased monitoring
of the responsible firm(s), and introduction of further regulations. Consumer re-
sponse tends to be focused on the products and firms involved, through reduced
consumption and legal action in the form of individual or class action lawsuits.
If the event is particularly serious, there may be short-lived spillover effects on
demand in food chains with similar products. As shown in figure 1, private risks
affect market integration and vice versa.
Market integration has the largest effect, however, where public risks are being
managed; that is, they extend far beyond the chain where they are discovered, dis-
rupting national industries and reducing market integration. Public risk events,
such as BSE or Foot and Mouth Disease, cause large-scale disruption due to na-
tional regulatory responses, including border closures. Private risk is magnified
due to market curtailment or loss. In such cases, it is common for government
and industry to work together to control the hazard and re-open export markets.
Government and firm reactions affect the level of regulatory and market in-
tegration. Government responses include further risk assessment, supporting or
requiring changes in the production/processing systems operated by individual
firms, improving detection/identification systems, supporting research aimed at
reducing risk, and assisting the industry in recovering from the negative financial
and reputation effects. Policy decisions for trading partners concern conditions
that result in closing the border, which products will be affected, and when to
re-open the border to all or selected products. Longer-term decisions revolve
around risk management strategies and the degree to which regulations will be
integrated or harmonized with those of major trading partners. Firms’ choices on
how to manage the risk of market disruption and potential disintegration directly
affect the level of market integration.
Table 1. NAFTA beef and cattle consumption and trade, 2002
2002 Beef Consumption and Trade (in ’000 metric tons)
Net Trade as a
Percentage of
Consumption Imports Exports Net Trade Consumption
Canada 992 307 610 303 30.54%
Mexico 2,409 489 10 −479 −19.88%
U.S. 12,738 1,460 1,110 −350 −2.75%
2002 Cattle Slaughter and Trade (in ’000 animals)
Net Trade as a
Percentage of
Slaughter Imports Exports Net Trade Slaughter
Canada 3,753 138 1,690 1,552 41.35%
Mexico 8,310 206 948 742 8.93%
U.S. 36,970 2,503 244 −2,259 −6.11%
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service.
BSE as a Case Study
The relationships between levels of market integration, regulatory integration,
and public and private risk are complex. Our case study of BSE in the North
American beef industry uses the framework developed in figure 1 to examine
the implications of having an integrated market without a supporting integrated
regulatory infrastructure. Under NAFTA, this market has become integrated on
every level of the supply chain from feed production through prepared food
products. This integration was severely challenged in 2003 when both Canada
and the United States confirmed their first BSE cases.
Market Integration in the NAFTA Beef Industries
Prior to CUSTA and NAFTA, tariffs inhibited trade in cattle and beef among
Canada, Mexico, and the United States; their beef industries operated relatively
independently. Relaxation and integration of trade regulations through CUSTA
(1989) and NAFTA (1994), along with changes to Canadian grain transportation
subsidies, led to a dramatic increase in the integration of beef production and
marketing in the three countries.
Trade in beef animals and products falls into two broad categories: live cattle,
destined for feedlots or processing, and beef, which refers to the meat products
from processed cattle. Other categories, like tallow, offal, and hides, comprise
less than 1% of industry trade. Table 1 shows the relative sizes of the NAFTA
beef industries in 2002, the last full year before BSE cases were confirmed. As the
largest consumer of beef in the world, the United States drives the NAFTA beef
industry.
Trade patterns within NAFTA (figure 2) reflect the different private opportu-
nities and risks of the three countries, particularly differences in comparative
Figure 2. NAFTA cattle and beef trade flows, 2002 and 2003
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advantage and market structure. Canada’s relatively low-cost production system
has allowed it to expand exports of live cattle and beef to the United States, the
recipient of 90% of Canadian exports (Poulin and Boame). The percentage of to-
tal Canadian beef production exported to the U.S. increased from 12% in 1990
to almost 48% in 2002. Canadian cattle herds grew by approximately 50% since
CUSTA and the termination of the Crow grain transportation subsidy, while U.S.
and Mexican herds saw little growth (Canfax and Gracey; U.S. Department of
Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service).
NAFTA cattle trade occurs primarily in the form of Canada and Mexico sup-
plying U.S. feedlot operators and processors with live animals, with 68% from
Canada in 2002 and Mexico supplying the rest, mainly to feedlots (U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 2004b). Many U.S. feedlots and
processing facilities became dependent on imported cattle for normal operations.
Trade in beef and veal products within NAFTA is less significant (figure 2). Al-
though the U.S. is a net importer of beef within NAFTA, it has taken on an export
role as a source of products targeted for higher end consumption in Canada and
Mexico.
Although the U.S. and Canada rank second and third in global beef exports with
16% and 15% of the global trade, respectively, the U.S. is the only major NAFTA
exporter and importer in non-NAFTA markets (U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Economic Research Service, 2004b). Sixty-five percent of U.S. beef exports were to
non-NAFTA countries, mainly Japan and Korea. About 66% of beef imports were
from non-NAFTA countries, predominantly from Australia and New Zealand.
Thus, while the integration of the beef industries within NAFTA has increased
dramatically, the degree of integration varies radically by country. Canada’s
1.45 million cattle exported to the U.S. annually comprise almost 25% of Canadian
cattle inventories but amount to less than 5% of U.S. numbers. In contrast, Mexico’s
cattle exports to the U.S. amount to only 3% of Mexican cattle inventories. As a
result, the private risks from trade disruption are markedly different across the
countries.
Regulating BSE as a Public Risk
BSE is a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSEs) that affects the central
nervous system in cattle and is an animal health risk. BSE also is thought to be
linked to the human disease variant Creutzfedlt–Jacob Disease (vCJD) through
the consumption of meat products from BSE-infected cattle. BSE first emerged
in the United Kingdom (UK) in the 1980s, reaching a peak of over 37,000 cases
in 1992 (OIE, 2004a, 2004d). BSE cases have been confirmed in over 20 countries,
including most of the EU, Japan, Canada, and the United States (OIE, 2004a,
2004c). No cases have been reported in Mexico.
The management of BSE-related risk requires a broad set of public and private
measures ranging from feed practices to the movement of live animals, surveil-
lance, slaughter, distribution of beef products, rendering, and even handling of
plate waste. From a trade perspective, the regulation of BSE is accomplished
through international standards that are interpreted and applied at the national
level. However, national interpretation of the international standards and a lack of
regulatory integration are disrupting trade patterns and reversing the integration
of the NAFTA beef markets.
International OIE Standards Regarding BSE Status
and Import Restrictions
Because BSE is a transmissible animal disease that impacts animal and animal
product trade, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) develops inter-
national standards and guidance for the management of BSE and the sanitary
safety of world trade. OIE is an inter-governmental organization created by in-
ternational agreement; it currently has 167 member countries. As noted, the SPS
agreement recognizes OIE standards as reference international sanitary rules.
The OIE outlines five levels of BSE status in its Terrestrial Animal Health Code
(OIE, 2003): BSE-free, BSE-provisionally free, minimal BSE risk, moderate BSE
risk, and high BSE risk. The Code lays out five criteria for determining BSE
status (see OIE, 2003, for more details). These criteria set a consistent world-
wide hurdle for a country or zone wishing to present evidence regarding its BSE
status.
The BSE levels are linked to OIE judgments regarding the degree of trade restric-
tions that may be imposed by a country that would be consistent with protecting
animal and public health (OIE, 2003). At the same time, the restrictions must meet
WTO requirements that regulations not be more trade restrictive than necessary
and that measures applied to imports must be the same as those applied do-
mestically. Under the Code, several classes of commodities, including milk and
milk products, protein-free tallow, and hides and skins, should be authorized for
importation regardless of the BSE status of the exporting country or zone. The
provisions for cattle, and fresh beef (bone-in and deboned) and meat products
from cattle, are very detailed. The essential point, however, is that the provisions
do not suggest complete prohibition of imports when BSE is detected. Instead, for
example, “fresh meat may be imported safely from a country of any BSE status
but with increasing restrictions so that, for countries presenting a high BSE risk,
more severe measures are applied to the cattle and to the meat itself. The experts
consider that, if these measures are followed, the meat is safe (OIE, 2004b).”
National Interpretation of BSE Standards
The OIE does not assign countries to the five levels. Instead, importing countries
use the levels to judge other countries and then apply their own trade restrictions.
In practice, establishing a BSE designation is relatively straightforward, although
controversy may exist regarding the adequacy of surveillance and monitoring
programs to detect BSE. It is clear that when a case is confirmed, a country loses
its BSE-free or BSE-provisionally free status and likely enters the minimal BSE
risk level unless additional information indicates a higher incidence of BSE in its
cattle herd.
The huge trade impacts from a BSE case come not from the loss of BSE-free
status per se, but from how national governments react to the loss of this status,
i.e., how they have interpreted and implemented OIE standards. The initial re-
action across the board has been total bans on cattle and beef imports imposed
by trading partners, rather than the graduated restrictions recommended by OIE.
The OIE points out that, except for short suspensions of trade during investigation
following the confirmation of a case, “It is apparent that some member countries
are applying trade bans when an exporting country reports the presence of BSE,
without consulting the recommendations in the Code or conducting a risk anal-
ysis in accordance with its OIE and WTO obligations (OIE 2004b).” The OIE says
such actions result in trade disruptions that are unnecessary to protect human
and animal health and present a perverse incentive by penalizing countries that
implement well-structured and transparent surveillance systems. Since the ban
is not based on a risk analysis, it will be unclear what steps would be necessary
to allow resumption of imports. The most significant risk associated with BSE
appears to be political rather than scientific.
Disintegration of the NAFTA Market Due to the 2003
BSE Cases
The BSE cases in Canada in May 2003, and in the U.S. in December 2003, re-
sulted in complete closure of international borders to beef and cattle. The clo-
sures went far beyond OIE recommendations and temporarily reversed NAFTA
market integration. The resulting impact on private business risk was highly de-
pendent on the cattle and beef trade patterns of each country. Canadian cattle
farmers and feedlot operators felt the largest impact. The Canadian domestic
market was too small to absorb the Canadian beef produced for export and prices
plummeted by at least 50% at the farm gate and 10–15% at retail (Boame, Par-
sons, and Trant). Falling domestic prices knocked out most foreign competition
and imports into Canada remained at 50% of their usual level for the remain-
der of 2003 (Industry Canada). In September 2003, the United States opened its
border to boneless beef products and by mid-November, the weekly sales vol-
ume for Canadian beef exports had fully recovered (Binkley, 2003a). Exports of
live cattle had not resumed by mid-2005 and Canadian prices for beef and cattle
remained low.
Subsequent analysis by Statistics Canada (2005) suggests that revenues in the
Canadian beef industry declined by C$5.3 billion due to lower prices and lost
sales to the U.S. By September 2004, Canadian governments had paid out over
C$1.4 billion in BSE relief programs. The prolonged inability to sell live cattle into
the U.S. has resulted in a shift in government programs from disaster relief to sup-
porting slaughter capacity expansion through grants and loans. These programs
result from growing awareness that under the current situation, cattle market in-
tegration is risky. It is less risky to process cattle in Canada and sell beef into the
U.S., thus shifting processing jobs to Canada. Imports from the U.S. in 2004 were
70% below pre-BSE levels (Statistics Canada, 2005).
The closure of the Canadian border in May 2003 appeared to have an initial
negative spillover effect on cattle trade with Mexico, as U.S. buyers seemed to
cut imports until they had time to fully assess the risks associated with all im-
ported cattle. The effect for Mexico was relatively short-lived since the U.S. beef
production system is highly dependent on imports of cattle. By autumn 2003,
Mexican cattle had replaced much of the Canadian live cattle exports to the U.S.
(U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 2004a).
U.S. prices for both beef and cattle rose throughout 2003 to record highs (Hahn)
as the industry struggled to cope with increasing demand and reduced Canadian
supply. The disruptions created by the Canadian event were compounded when
BSE was confirmed in the U.S. on December 23, 2003, effectively closing its export
markets for cattle and beef products. As a net importer, the U.S. was able to
redirect its exports into the domestic market; however, the U.S. market remained
under-supplied putting upward pressure on prices for live cattle and retail beef.
The cessation of beef exports from the U.S. to Mexico provided an opportunity for
Mexican producers to capture more of the higher-end Mexican market. In 2004,
Mexican imports were forecast to fall to 20% of previously predicted levels and
Trejo estimated that retail prices increased 15% by mid-2004.
Dealing with BSE: Public and Private Responses
Governments must balance a set of objectives in dealing with risks such as BSE
(Caswell). Ultimate risk management decisions rest on a complex consideration
of plant, animal, or human health risks, financial risks to industries, and market
risks. Sandman and Lanard capture this reality in their characterization of U.S.
BSE policy prior to the December 2003 case, “The U.S. government was protect-
ing public health from vCJD as much as it wanted—not as much as possible, but
as much as it thought appropriate. And its judgment about how much protec-
tion was appropriate was influenced, sensibly enough, by the fact that so far the
U.S. had not found any mad cows at all.” Public and private preparation for the
confirmation of BSE cases in North America has proven to be inadequate.
Protecting Public Health: Revamping Regulations in Crisis Mode
Countries around the world responded to the BSE epidemic in the United
Kingdom by implementing regulatory requirements for firms in order to control
the establishment and spread of BSE in cattle herds. Central elements included
restrictions on feeding ruminant proteins to ruminants and the establishment of
surveillance systems to detect BSE. In both Canada and the United States, the
immediate reaction to each having a 2003 BSE case was the institution of new
anti-BSE measures. These were particularly sweeping in the United States, lead-
ing critics to argue that prior regulations were clearly inadequate and that public
health had not been adequately protected.
Protecting Industry Viability: Reopening Borders
Regaining BSE-free status for both Canada and the U.S. will take several years
but both countries are eager to resume full trade under some sort of minimal
risk status. There are essentially two routes to accomplish border re-openings.
The first is demonstrating that the country meets OIE criteria to be classified as
minimal BSE risk and encouraging importing countries to follow the relatively
unrestrictive OIE trade guidelines. However, countries would have to apply the
same standards to others who want to export into their countries.
The second option is to negotiate the reopening of borders on an ad hoc basis
pending demonstration of compliance with OIE and countries’ own criteria. This
is a challenge when the countries have taken a different approach to managing
BSE risk, as have Japan and the U.S. The NAFTA countries have more similar risk
attitudes and management strategies and have taken steps to reopen borders on
an ad hoc basis largely consistent with OIE guidelines for a country with min-
imal risk. These actions themselves constitute an initial step toward regulatory
integration. In September 2003, the U.S. awarded a special low risk BSE classifica-
tion to Canada and allowed the importation of boneless Canadian beef and other
products from cattle less than 30 months of age (Acord, Feldman, and Binkley).
Mexico took similar action toward Canada (Binkley, 2003b). This has resulted in
only moderate U.S. price relief. A U.S. Department of Agriculture report estimates
that re-opening the border to Canadian feeder cattle would result in a return to
more normal pricing levels with a shift of roughly $631 million from producer
surplus to consumer surplus, and a net gain of $12.6 million. Reopening the bor-
der to all beef imports would increase the shift to $1.3 to $1.5 billion and a net
gain of $91 to $101 million depending on pricing assumptions (U.S. Department
of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service). In March and April
2004, Mexico and Canada partially lifted their bans on U.S. beef imports (Lewis).
As a result of these actions, the NAFTA beef market was largely, but not
completely, reintegrated within months of the BSE cases being confirmed. This
could be interpreted to indicate that ad hoc regulatory integration within NAFTA
worked reasonably well in response to BSE. However, the key point is that the
magnitude of the short-term disruption could have been greatly mitigated by
better preparation by NAFTA countries. Furthermore, until mid-2005, the U.S.
border remained closed to imports of live cattle from Canada. The economic im-
pact of trade disruption on the Canadian cattle industry continued as domestic
slaughter capacity was inadequate to handle the available volume of live cattle.
Protecting Industry Viability: Compensating Industry
An issue in integrated agricultural markets is compensation and subsidies in
the case of a public risk event impacting a domestic industry. For example, the
Canadian and provincial governments took several actions to stabilize and sup-
port the devastated domestic beef industry, ending supplementary beef imports
where Canadian products could be supplied, implementing work share programs
to keep processing facilities open, and creating price support programs (Statistics
Canada, 2003; LeRoy, Weerahewa, and Anderson). For example, the Canadian
government devoted C$995 million to compensate farmers and, to a much lesser
extent, processors for their losses related to the trade disruptions. Compensation
has not been made in the U.S. where supplies are tight and prices remain high.
Relief programs could provide an unfair advantage to one member of the trad-
ing region. Similarly, government investments in systems designed to prevent or
control BSE could be viewed as a subsidy that provides an unfair trade advantage.
To date, BSE farm disaster relief has not become a subsidy issue at the WTO or
within NAFTA. However, the potential for challenges exists.
Industry Reaction to BSE Risks
The primary risks to private firms from BSE are from the loss of international
markets for an unspecified period of time and the resulting increase in domes-
tic competition. Within NAFTA, the private risk level varied depending on two
factors. The first was product type. Although borders closed for all parts of the
industry, they opened much more quickly for boneless beef products from young
animals than for boned products from older animals or live cattle.
The degree of export dependence was the second factor affecting private risk.
Firms in export-focused Canada faced the greatest risk associated with a con-
firmed BSE case. The closure of the U.S. border in 2003 put significant pressure on
the Canadian market and, in turn, relieved the impact of the U.S. BSE case for U.S.
producers. If only a U.S. case had been found, Canadian beef and cattle would
have continued to enter the U.S. and the oversupply caused by the cessation of
U.S. exports would have been more widely distributed across the NAFTA region.
Private risk management strategies should be two pronged. First, they should
contribute to reducing the national risk of a BSE event by implementing appropri-
ate prevention, monitoring, and tracing systems. Second, they should position the
firm to minimize the impact of a national BSE event. BSE risk-reduction strategies
may be industry-wide, such as adopting industry traceability standards or mon-
itoring adherence to feed bans. Strategies also may be supply chain specific, such
as enhanced traceability or more extensive testing for BSE for export markets.
The 2003 BSE cases exposed major weaknesses in public and private animal
tracing systems. Tracking animals to their source, tracing offspring and cohorts,
and tracking feed sources proved time consuming, laborious, and only partially
successful. Two additional BSE cases in Canada in early 2005, and a second case
confirmed in the United States in June 2005, also raised concerns over adherence
to feed bans. Even with the disruptions caused by BSE, the major opposition to
stricter controls was from the industry, which is concerned about higher costs
(Acord and Feldman).
In the current environment, reversing market integration, or market disintegra-
tion, appears to be the most likely strategy for reducing firm exposure to risk from
BSE in live cattle markets. Firms shipping processed beef from young animals face
much shorter disruptions than farmers or firms shipping live animals or beef from
older animals. Shifting production toward more domestic processing destined for
export would reduce the impact of BSE cases, particularly for Canada and Mexico.
This strategy reduces the future supply of foreign feeder cattle for U.S. feedlots
and processing facilities when the border reopens and could reduce the process-
ing output from U.S. facilities. Such strategies will be implemented at the firm
level. In Canada, national and regional support for this strategy is apparent. For
example, the Canadian government has made money available to support the
development of more cattle processing capacity in Canada and producer groups
are taking an active role in promoting and planning for new capacity. By mid-
2005, Canadian processing capacity was reported to already have increased by
30% (Binkley, 2005). More traditional strategies related to diversifying products
and/or production locations may be employed as well.
Integrated Markets—Integrated Regulations and Planning?
The central question is not whether nations and firms are able to develop BSE-
related risk management strategies independently, but whether this is the best
strategy for jointly protecting and promoting trade and market integration. Prior
to 2003, the NAFTA countries had developed a closely integrated beef market in
the absence of anything but the most rudimentary regulatory integration. As a
result, the confirmation of BSE cases within NAFTA resulted in large trade dis-
ruptions. The bulk of these could have been avoided if the NAFTA countries had
developed more closely coordinated risk management programs based on the
guidance of international standards. Market integration had outrun regulatory
integration, leaving markets very vulnerable to disintegration when faced with a
public risk such as BSE. If the NAFTA countries were ill prepared for BSE, what
could they have done, or could they do, to develop NAFTA-wide risk manage-
ment plans, integrated regulations, and cooperative responses to different BSE
scenarios?
Considerations in Developing a NAFTA Approach to BSE
With BSE, as with many other public and private risk management challenges,
there is uncertainty regarding the benefits and costs of taking action because of
uncertainty about the severity of the risks involved, the efficacy of steps that can
be taken to mitigate them, and the costs involved. Countries develop different
regulatory programs that reflect the nuances of their own benefit–cost calcula-
tion and their available resources. For example, Japan is currently testing every
animal used for beef products for BSE based on what the government thinks is
necessary to sustain consumer confidence. The U.S. views this requirement as un-
reasonable. Countries cannot coordinate policy closely, let alone seek equivalence
or harmonization, unless they agree on approaches to risk assessment and risk
management.
NAFTA does not have any bureaucratic mechanism for developing integrated
regulatory approaches to risk management beyond committees and working
groups that meet intermittently. The integration of systems for BSE risk manage-
ment is rudimentary within NAFTA. Some progress is evident in that the system
avoided new disruptions in beef trade when two additional BSE cases were con-
firmed in Canada and one in the United States in 2005. However, less progress
is evident on other fronts. For example, representatives from the three countries
have developed a joint strategy and issued a Report of the North American Chief
Veterinary Officers (CVOs) on Harmonization of a BSE Strategy on March 17, 2005.
From a regulatory integration perspective, calling the plan “harmonization” is a
bit of a misnomer. The CVOs state that they have developed:
. . . a set of minimum standards for BSE measures in North America. These min-
imum standards will be presented to the appropriate animal health and public
health officials in each country for consideration within the respective regulatory
processes, and therefore should be considered pre-decisional (p. 1).
Thus the harmonized strategy represents fairly weak policy coordination. The
strategy will be sorely tested should a BSE case be confirmed in Mexico.
The development of an integrated NAFTA approach is complicated by the
response to BSE in non-NAFTA countries. For example, if a country authorizes
beef imports from Canada but not the U.S., Canada must be able to show that
U.S. product is not present in Canadian exports. If the NAFTA countries had
harmonized systems, approval of one for export would imply approval of all
and no need for monitoring of cross-shipping between countries. However, in
this case, a problem in one would automatically be attributed to all. The use
of more extensive public and/or private track and trace systems might allow
the exclusion of products from one nation while continuing the exports from
nonaffected partners but it is unlikely that this would be acceptable to trading
partners.
What Would a NAFTA BSE Management Program Look Like?
A preferred system for NAFTA BSE risk management would be harmonized
and borderless with the same or highly compatible standards and risk manage-
ment strategies used throughout the NAFTA beef production and marketing sys-
tem. It would involve three components: establishing regulations or standards,
applying those standards in the operation of the industry, and monitoring the
application of the regulations or standards throughout the industry. Setting the
regulations is a government responsibility but applying them is a combined public
and private activity.
While defining the full details is beyond the scope of this paper, table 2 lists
the requirements for a harmonized BSE risk management strategy, the status
of the NAFTA beef industries in meeting each requirement, and the likelihood
of achieving NAFTA consensus and implementation in the near term. The list is
daunting and does not begin to reflect the complexity of the underlying public risk
management policies and private risk management strategies. This complexity,
the effort needed to harmonize policy, and the potential loss of the ability to
tailor programs to domestic circumstances are the main roadblocks to regulatory
integration.
However, since each country must have a regulatory structure in place to ac-
complish BSE management, there may be benefits in terms of efficiencies in joint
development of a plan. The major benefit of harmonized policy would be an inte-
grated regulatory system that supports market integration and provides increased
assurance to private parties against market disruption. The success of any NAFTA
BSE management system will depend on more than regulatory integration.
Table 2. Requirements for an integrated NAFTA BSE
management program
State of the Industry Likelihood of
Requirement and Regulations NAFTA Agreement
Harmonization of feed
regulations concerning
the use of animal protein
in cattle and dairy feed.
Regulations are fairly
consistent across
NAFTA. However,
testing and monitoring
regimes vary.
High for standards.
Moderate for
monitoring and testing.
Standards for production,
shipping, and slaughter.
U.S. has moved to a
common process-based
system for meat
products, requiring
HACCP for firms
shipping processed meat
into the U.S. However,
this is only for one range
of products and one
level of the beef supply
chain.
Reasonable for HACCP
but much lower at other
levels of the chain, in
part due to national
differences in
production systems.
Common requirements for
tracking animals
through the system.
Requires common data
standards, the
integration of systems
for information and
trace-back in the event
of a problem.
Systems are rudimentary
in most cases. Resistance
to mandatory
implementation is high,
particularly in the U.S.
Capabilities among
small farming
operations in all three
countries are low.
Traceability systems will
continue to be
implemented,
particularly in Canada.
Full NAFTA systems in
the near term are
unlikely.
A common testing regime
where participants in
each country use:
Testing regimes broadly
based on OIE standards
but vary in testing
frequency. Standards for
tracking and reporting
are not common across
NAFTA. In Canada,
tracking is mandated for
individual animals, but
roughly 30% of U.S.
animals are tracked
individually and
tracking is lower in
Mexico.
Agreement on testing
regimes and
technologies is possible.
Coordinating testing
programs, tracking
capabilities, and data
standards is less likely.
a. Technologies
approved by all
parties.
b. Common standards
for testing frequency.
c. Common standards
for storage and
reporting results.
d. Common approaches
to exception testing.
Jointly planned response
to outbreaks anywhere
in the system.
Recent outbreaks have
revealed deficiencies in
planning. Some are
being addressed under
BSE and bioterrorism
programs.
Although there are
discussions, nations are
working on internal
plans first.
Continued
Table 2. Continued
State of the Industry Likelihood of
Requirement and Regulations NAFTA Agreement
Agreement on subsidy
levels
Subsidies for systems are
not yet addressed.
Canada has
compensation program
for BSE disruptions.
Agreement unlikely.
a. For investments in
traceability and
testing systems.
b. For industry
participants in the
event of an outbreak.
A common approach to
monitoring the
execution of the
regulations regarding
inputs, processing,
testing, and tracing.
Agreement on the
principles of HACCP for
ensuring safety and
monitoring. No
consensus on specifics
for BSE.
This will likely be an
equivalence situation.
Market participants at all levels of the NAFTA beef industry must take an active
role in integrating their risk management systems, particularly their traceability
and testing systems.
Lessons Learned
There are two likely culprits when agricultural and food markets are severely
disrupted because of plant health, animal health, or food safety risks: inadequate
risk management within a country or a lack of harmonized risk management
approaches between countries. Both are present in the case of BSE in NAFTA.
First, risk management programs in Canada and the U.S. were inadequate to
prevent the confirmation of cases causing both to lose their presumptive BSE-
free status. An alternative perspective is that the countries failed to structure risk
management programs under which the confirmation of a small number of cases
could be convincingly presented as being within the bounds indicating very low
risk.
Second, the NAFTA market has suffered from poor harmonization of BSE pol-
icy. While this is somewhat common across the world, the overwhelming bulk
of the trade affected by the NAFTA BSE cases in 2003 was internal to NAFTA.
Regardless of whether the world decided to abide by OIE guidance, the NAFTA
countries could have done so, developed more closely coordinated risk manage-
ment programs around OIE guidance, and thereby avoided much of the trade
disruption. There was adequate time to develop such an approach because the
BSE risk and the consequences of a case have been known for years.
NAFTA countries are pursuing high levels of market integration through the
elimination of tariff barriers but have a relatively primitive level of coordination in
regard to nontariff barriers. The BSE case illustrates the risks to which industries
are exposed when economic integration outruns regulatory integration. NAFTA
currently has no mechanism to move toward regulatory integration, except on
a very fragmented, ad hoc basis. This will be a continuing drag on market in-
tegration and will lead to a reversal of that integration when major risk events
occur. Failure to address regulatory integration will leave other integrated mar-
kets, such as the NAFTA hog industry, vulnerable to the same type of disruption
as experienced in the beef industry with BSE.
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